A former top homeland security adviser to the Bush administration, Frank Cilluffo had long dreamed of the day that Osama bin Laden would no longer be a threat to the United States.
When that dream became reality Sunday night, Mr. Cilluffo, now the director of GW’s Homeland Security Policy Institute, joined the crowds at the White House along with his family. “We went not necessarily to celebrate but to mark the occasion,” he said. “It is hard to conceive of a more fitting closing chapter.”
Mr. Cilluffo talked to George Washington Today about Osama bin Laden’s death and how it has redrawn the homeland security map for America.
Q: Are Americans safer without Osama bin Laden?
A: His demise is certainly momentous, but, unfortunately, it is by no means the end of al Qaeda or the more general threat that we face. Prior to his death, bin Laden no longer retained the operational role that he once did.
The threat had already metastasized and morphed, such that it now comes in various shapes, sizes and flavors. From a strategic perspective, the range of threats that we still face today includes a witch’s brew in Pakistan that encompasses Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehrik-e Taliban and the Haqqani network.
For years however, bin Laden’s ability to evade justice had entrenched itself as part of prevailing lore – and that, in turn, helped fuel recruitment and replenish our adversaries’ ranks. Now that piece of the story has been definitively rewritten. The significance of this point should not be underestimated, especially in a context where narrative and counter-narrative are important dimensions of the battlefield.
Q: You’ve clearly been following Osama bin Laden closely since your White House days. What was your reaction to his death?
A: Actually, I’ve been following bin Laden and terrorism-related issues for years, long before joining the White House. What struck me about his death was that it was a storybook ending in that he met his end at the hands of the U.S. military, face to face and one on one.
In fact, if I said I wasn’t excited upon hearing the news, I would be lying. First thing I did was reach out via email to colleagues who have worked this issue and to victims who have suffered terribly as a result of al Qaeda’s actions. Although the professional in me said inhale, exhale, cheer and get back to work, the reality is that I joined the crowd – including a throng of GW students – outside the White House shortly after midnight, stopping off there with my wife and daughters on our way back from New York this weekend.
Q: What about the fact that Osama bin Laden was, hiding in plain sight, so to speak? What do you think will be the impact on relations between the U.S. and Pakistan?
A: We’ve known for some time that there are elements within the Pakistani security services and Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) that are sympathetic to al Qaeda. As a result, finding bin Laden where we did was not so much surprising as it was troubling. Certainly it poses some significant questions for U.S.-Pakistani relations moving forward.
Yet we need to continue to work with Pakistan, and we need to do so in a way that maintains our flexibility. Against this background, a light footprint is the way to go – which means that Special Forces and unmanned aerial vehicles will remain crucial elements in our toolkit.
Q: What will happen to al-Qaeda without bin Laden? How can we expect it to change?
A: Al Qaeda had already experienced transformation prior to bin Laden’s death. The core organization and its senior leadership (minus bin Laden) continue to exist, but a range of affiliates have also emerged over time – the most active of which is al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), operating out of Yemen.
There are also groups and individuals who have been inspired by al Qaeda, but have no link to it beyond an affinity for the ideology. Even in Pakistan, there exists a wide range and conflation of jihadi forces, including al Qaeda, the Haqqani network, Lashkar-e-Taiba, Tehrik-e Taliban, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan.
In short, al Qaeda without bin Laden will persist in its various guises, but, unfortunately, it is only one of many threats in the prevailing security ecosystem. Ungoverned and under-governed spaces provide our adversaries the room and time they need to exist as well as flourish, hence, this is no time to let down our guard.
Q: Who becomes America’s most wanted with bin Laden gone?
A: Ayman al-Zawahiri, the number two al Qaeda senior leadership figure (after bin Laden) and a key architect of 9/11 and other al Qaeda attacks, is still out there. So too is Ilyas Kashmiri, whose international and operational experience is both broad and deep. Anwar al Awlaki, an American and “a bridge figure” whose cultural fluency has facilitated appeal to Westerners and spawned recruitment and radicalization, also remains at large.
While bridge figures may not be operational leaders, they provide the mood music to which jihadis dance. Regrettably Awlaki is just one of many such bridge figures, including Al-Shabaab’s (Somalia) American Omar Hammami. Other potential successors to bin Laden include: Abu Yahya al-Libi; former Guantanamo prisoner and Taliban operations chief, Abdullah Zakir; and AQAP leader and former aide to bin Laden, Nasir al-Wahayshi. Consigning bin Laden to history is, therefore, just one strike off our “most wanted” list.
Q: What should Americans expect in terms of retaliatory strikes? Have there been specific, credible threats yet?
A: There is certainly reason to be concerned as al Qaeda will surely seek to demonstrate its continuing relevance and capacity. In this sense, we have entered a window of vulnerability during which al Qaeda may seek to fast-track plans that were already in development. The flip side is that this circumstance also presents a window of opportunity: As our adversaries rear their heads, it offers us a chance to go after them.
In the short run, during this period of vulnerability/opportunity, we need to figure out how to surge – and smartly. That said, we must not let down our guard when this window closes. Instead, we must keep raising the bar for our standard operating procedures, evolving and enhancing our own capabilities, to push and keep our adversaries off balance.